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The Little Statute that Gets No Respect: How Courts
Have Ignored the Administrative Procedure Act with
Respect to Whether Pre-Enforcement Challenge
Provisions Are Exclusive
Arthur G. Sapper*
This article discusses a provision of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) that the federal courts have failed to apply—the third sentence of
section 703, which states: “Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and
exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law, agency action
is subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial
enforcement.”1 The provision means, in essence, that when one is accused
of violating an agency regulation, one may challenge its validity. Section
703’s third sentence also supplies criteria to determine when the right to
challenge may be denied: when the law provides a pre-enforcement
challenge that is “adequate” and “exclusive.”
Instead of applying those criteria, however, the federal courts have
developed their own. This is unfortunate. First, the results they have
reached have been mixed and inconsistent with section 703. Yet, “[t]he
APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of variation and
diversity.”2 Second, and more important, statutes are not supposed to be
ignored. Yet, no court of appeals has ever considered section 703 in its
discussions of whether a pre-enforcement challenge provision is
exclusive.
This article describes the cases on the exclusivity of pre-enforcement
challenge provisions under one representative statute and shows that many
of these decisions are inconsistent with section 703. It also suggests some
reasons why courts have applied judge-made law instead of the APA
provision, and recommends that the Supreme Court take a step to rectify
the problem.

* Senior Counsel, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Washington, D.C.; former
deputy general counsel, Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission; former special counsel,
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission; former adjunct professor of occupational safety
and health law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2018).
2. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999).
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I. Background: The Judge-Made Law on the Exclusivity of
Pre-Enforcement Challenge Provisions
At one time, case law generally stated that one may raise the validity
of a federal regulation when it was enforced.3 In fact, “the courts typically
reviewed the lawfulness of an agency’s rule, not when it was promulgated,
but when it was enforced.”4 It was not until 1967, in Abbott Laboratories
v. Gardner, that the Supreme Court broadly held that adversely affected
persons may also obtain pre-enforcement review of the validity of a
regulation even if a statute does not expressly provide for it.5
Suppose a statute does expressly provide for pre-enforcement review
of the validity of a regulation but is silent on whether such review is the
exclusive way that one may challenge the regulation’s validity. There are
several such pre-enforcement review provisions, such as those in the
Administrative Orders Review Act (sometimes known as the Hobbs Act),6
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”),7 and the Food, Drug
and Cosmetics Act.8 They provide for fifty-nine- or sixty-day periods for
such review but do not state that they are exclusive. Are they exclusive?
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has several times addressed the question, most notably in JEM
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. There, it held that where a statute provides a
limited period for pre-enforcement review of a regulation’s validity, and
that opportunity for review is adequate, that period is exclusive as to socalled “procedural” invalidity arguments, but not exclusive as to so-called
“substantive” invalidity arguments.9 According to that court:
3. E.g., United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 181 F.2d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir.
1950) (“Even if petitioner is unable to prove the irreparable injury necessary in a suit for injunction,
he may raise the invalidity of the Commission’s action as a defense to an enforcement proceeding
instituted against him for violation of the rule in question.”); see also Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n,
387 U.S. 167, 185 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (“[E]xcept for [certain] instances . . . , the avenue for
attack upon the statute and regulations has been by defense to specific enforcement actions by the
agency.”); Abbott Lab’ys v. Celebrezze, 352 F.2d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 1965) (“[I]f enforcement should
be attempted . . . there are provisions for administrative hearing and review by the Court of Appeals.”),
rev’d on other grounds, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
4. STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 1136 (2d ed. 1985).
5. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (2018).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (2018).
8. 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (2018).
9. 22 F.3d 320, 324–25 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (concerning the Hobbs Act) (citing Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 939 F.2d 1035, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1991); NLRB Union v. FLRA, 834 F.2d 191,
195–97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (summarizing circuit law with respect to various types of challenges); Nat.
Res. Defense Council v. NRC, 666 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973, 977–78
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A substantive defense is one based on an argument that a regulation is
not authorized by a statute or the Constitution, as opposed to a claim under
the APA regarding the method used in promulgating the regulation, such
as that it was issued without adequate notice, or that the government
inadequately responded to comments.10
For defendants to properly raise a procedural invalidity defense, they
must have sued the agency within the pre-enforcement review period
(often sixty but sometimes as short as thirty days).11 This bar applies even
to entities that did not exist during the pre-enforcement challenge period.12
Under the D.C. Circuit’s line of cases, exclusivity depends on adequacy
alone, without an independent showing that Congress intended
exclusivity.13
Some other circuits have followed JEM Broadcasting.14 Some have
done so even when the issue was not technically presented.15 The Supreme
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 546–47 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959)). A careful reading of Functional Music fails to uncover any basis
for that court’s later reliance on it to distinguish between substantive and procedural challenges.
Although the legal theory underlying the challenge there was what JEM Broadcasting would later
characterize as “substantive” (a challenge to the statutory authority for the regulations), Functional
Music drew no such distinction. It never used the words “procedural” or “substantive,” and its
language was unqualifiedly broad, permitting challenges to “validity” generally. 274 F.2d at 546–47.
10. Coal River Energy, LLC v. Jewell, 751 F.3d 659, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
11. But see Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 290 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (“The 30-day limitation on judicial review imposed by the Clean Air Act would afford
precariously little time for many affected persons even if some adequate method of notice were
afforded. It also is totally unrealistic to assume that more than a fraction of the persons and entities
affected by a regulation—especially small contractors scattered across the country—would have
knowledge of its promulgation or familiarity with or access to the Federal Register.”).
12. Coal River Energy, 751 F.3d at 663.
13. See JEM Broad., 22 F.3d at 326. Since JEM Broadcasting was issued, the D.C. Circuit
also issued opinions on the issue in Coal River Energy, 751 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Reclamation
Act), and in Independent Community Bankers of America v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 195 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Bank Holding Company Act).
14. Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2016); Arctic Express, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Transp., 194 F.3d 767, 770 (6th Cir. 1999); Florilli Corp. v. Pena, 118 F.3d 1212, 1214 (8th
Cir. 1997). For pre-JEM Broadcasting cases outside the D.C. Circuit but following the D.C. Circuit’s
analysis in pre-JEM Broadcasting cases, see, e.g., Legal Env’t Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118
F.3d 1467, 1473 (11th Cir. 1997) and Advance Transp. Co. v. United States, 884 F.2d 303, 305 (7th
Cir. 1989).
15. See Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 263 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying JEM
Broadcasting, seemingly unnecessarily, to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)); Commonwealth of Pa. Dep’t of Pub.
Welfare v. HHS, 101 F.3d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1996) (also applying JEM Broadcasting, seemingly
unnecessarily, to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)). If the statute of limitations at 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) applies, then
there would appear no reason to invoke JEM Broadcasting. Section 2401(a) does not, however, apply
to the timeliness of invalidity defenses when the Government enforces a regulation. First, it applies by
its terms only to suits against the Government, not by the Government. Steffen v. United States, 213
F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1954) (“That section is limited to actions against the United States. We cannot
by analogy make it apply to actions brought by the United States.”) (emphasis in the original); Phila.
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Court has cited JEM Broadcasting, albeit in dicta, for the proposition that
“a party might be foreclosed in some instances from challenging the
procedures used to promulgate a given rule”16—a statement that could
equally describe the intended result of applying section 703.

II. The Wages of Ignoring APA § 703
Not once in the development of this line of judge-made law, under any
statutory scheme, did any circuit mention, let alone apply, section 703. The
result is a checkered pattern of holdings and disagreements among the
circuits. An illustration of this can be gleaned from case law developments
under the OSH Act. That statute has a fifty-nine-day pre-enforcement
challenge period that, as with the Hobbs Act and other statutes mentioned
above, is silent on whether it is exclusive.17
A. An Example: Case Law under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act
In summary, four circuits have permitted at least some substantive and
procedural challenges to OSHA standards (the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and
D.C.), with some question about the Third Circuit. The Fifth Circuit agreed
that challenges are permitted unless an employer participated in both a
rulemaking and a pre-enforcement suit. The D.C. Circuit recently
equivocated on one point, as discussed below. In contrast, two circuits (the
Eighth Circuit and perhaps the Sixth Circuit) permit substantive but not
procedural challenges. The picture in the Fourth Circuit is unclear.

Indem. Ins. Co. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 771 F.3d 391, 401 & n.7 (7th Cir. 2014) (“An affirmative defense
is not a ‘claim’” or “cause of action.”). Second, statutes of limitation by their nature do not foreclose
defensive arguments. United States v. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 72 (1956) (the limitations period has
“no relevance to” defensive arguments. “They are aimed at lawsuits, not at the consideration of
particular issues in lawsuits.”); TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 271 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing W. Pac.
R.R., 352 U.S. 59 at 72); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 545, 549 n.3 (2d Cir. 1963)
(“[L]imitations do not normally run against a defense.”).
16. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (2018). Also referred to as OSH Act § 6(f), the first sentence of which
reads as follows: “Any person who may be adversely affected by a standard issued under this section
may at any time prior to the sixtieth day after such standard is promulgated file a petition challenging
the validity of such standard with the United States court of appeals for the circuit wherein such person
resides or has his principal place of business, for a judicial review of such standard.”
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1. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit, in Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC, was
the first court to consider whether the OSH Act’s pre-enforcement
challenge provision is exclusive.18 The court did not start its discussion
with the general rule, embodied in prior case law and section 703, that
validity may be challenged during enforcement. Instead, the court asked
whether Congress intended to “authoriz[e] review of a standard’s validity
at the enforcement stage.”19 The court concluded that a House bill and
report showed that Congress intended to permit such challenges,20 and that
“policy considerations” indicated that they should be admitted.21 The
Third Circuit thus concluded, at first, that adjudicators could “deny
enforcement to a standard determined by it to have been issued in violation
of the Act’s substantive or procedural requirements.”22
Later, the opinion provided an alternative reason for this conclusion,
one resting on administrative law principles—that judicial review of
validity is ordinarily permitted during enforcement; that the mere
existence of a pre-enforcement challenge provision did not suffice to show
that Congress intended that provision to be exclusive; and that a contrary
result required “an explicit withdrawal of jurisdiction.”23 And had the
court stopped here, its analysis would have paralleled the analysis required
by section 703.
Unfortunately, the Third Circuit then set out an unsupported,
confused, and policy-laden dictum on a question not before it based on
reasoning inconsistent with section 703. It stated that a prosecuted
employer “cannot defend solely on the ground that . . . procedural
[rulemaking] requirements . . . have been ignored by the Secretary. To
carry its burden the [employer] must produce evidence showing why the
standard under review, as applied to it, is arbitrary, capricious,
18. 534 F.2d 541, 548–49 (3d Cir. 1976).
19. Id. at 549 n.10 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 548–49, citing H.R. 16785, 91st Cong § 11(b) (1970) and H.R.REP. NO. 91-1291, at
24, 41 (1970).
21. Id. at 549–50.
22. Id. at 550.
23. Id. at 551. The Third Circuit stated: “We do not find, from the availability of limited preenforcement judicial review permitted under § 6(f) [29 U.S.C. § 655(f)] and the silence with respect
to legal issues in § 11(a) [29 U.S.C. § 660(a), the provision for judicial review of the outcome of an
enforcement proceeding], an intention to limit the scope of judicial review in the enforcement
proceeding. Judicial review at that stage is, after all, the ordinarily preferred method. See Toilet Goods
Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163–64 (1967). Absent an explicit withdrawal of jurisdiction, we will
entertain affirmative defenses attacking the validity of an administrative regulation that is brought to
us for enforcement.”
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unreasonable or contrary to law.”24 The court failed to explain why an
agency that seeks to enforce a regulation adopted in violation of APA
rulemaking requirements would not thereby be acting “contrary to law.”
After all, an invalid regulation is a nullity.25 Worse, the reason that the
court gave for this dictum—that a contrary holding “would effectively
nullify the congressional circumscription of the right to petition for review
of an OSHA standard”—was inconsistent with the court’s own reading of
the legislative history, which showed Congress intended to permit validity
challenges during enforcement.26 In sum, the opinion was an internally
inconsistent muddle.
2. Fourth Circuit
In Daniel International Corp. v. OSHRC, the Fourth Circuit noted a
split that had by then developed in the circuits but avoided a ruling,
rejecting the validity challenge there on a harmless error ground.27
3. Fifth Circuit
In Deering Milliken, Inc. v. OSHRC, the Fifth Circuit relied on
Supreme Court case law requiring “a clear command before limiting
judicial review”28 and the OSH Act’s legislative history, particularly a
Senate report stating that section 655(f) “does not foreclose an employer
from challenging the validity of a standard during an enforcement
proceeding.”29 It then turned to an unusual situation presented by the OSH
Act: In 1971, OSHA had under a special grant of statutory authority
summarily adopted hundreds of standards, without notice-and-comment
rulemaking. The court held that employers could not have had an adequate
opportunity to challenge those hundreds of standards during the fifty-nineday challenge period provided by OSH Act section 6(f).30
24. Id. at 551–52.
25. Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 547–48 (“[I]f the rules were invalid, they
are a nullity . . . .”); see also Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2005); MCI Telecomms.
Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.3d 1136, 1142–43 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (invalidating rule for inadequate notice); Idaho
Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Ordinarily when a regulation is
not promulgated in compliance with the APA, the regulation is invalid.”).
26. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, 534 F.2d at 548–49; see supra note 20.
27. 656 F.2d 925, 930 (4th Cir. 1981).
28. 630 F.2d 1094, 1099 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970)).
29. Id. at 1099 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91–1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5184).
30. Id. OSH Act § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a), required the Labor Department to, within two
years (that is, between 1971 and 1973), adopt so-called “established Federal standards” (standards
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In RSR Corp. v. Donovan, the Fifth Circuit held that:
[W]hen an employer has participated in [an OSHA notice-and-comment]
rulemaking and [a] pre-enforcement review of an OSHA regulation and
could have then asserted either a substantive or procedural challenge to
its validity, but did not, and has no excuse for its failure to do so, we will
not entertain the challenge in an enforcement proceeding.31

4. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit’s discussion in Advance Bronze, Inc. v. Dole is
unclear, veering between the merits and the court’s authority to consider
the issue.32 At first, the court seemed to say that the challenge there—a
protest against the absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking—lacked
merit because a special provision of the OSH Act permitted summary
adoption.33 But it then cited with favor the Eighth Circuit’s holding in
National Industrial Constructors Inc. v. OSHRC,34 and stated that “this
court will not allow Advance to escape liability by raising a procedural
attack upon” the standard.35
5. Eighth Circuit
At first, the Eighth Circuit broadly held that employers could
challenge the validity of OSHA standards during enforcement. In
Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc. v. OSHRC, the employer challenged
a standard’s validity, arguing that it was infeasible as applied.36 The court
stated that “[i]t is clear from the legislative history . . . that judicial review

adopted under other federal statutes) and “national consensus standards” (private standards adopted
by industry) as standards enforceable under the OSH Act. OSHA was required to act summarily—that
is, without notice-and-comment rulemaking or findings (such as feasibility) that it would otherwise
have been required to make. OSHA adopted the vast bulk of such standards within a few weeks after
the Act’s April 28, 1971, effective date and nearly all at once. See 36 Fed. Reg. 10466 (May 29, 1971),
adopting hundreds of provisions. The provision under which nearly all subsequent standards were
adopted is OSH Act § 6(b), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b).
31. 747 F.2d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 1984). In Kiewit Pwr. Constr. Co. v. Sec’y of Lab., 959 F.3d
381, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (discussed infra note 47 and accompanying text), the D.C. Circuit
distinguished RSR from the usual challenge to a standard during enforcement on the ground that,
“[RSR] participated not only in the notice-and-comment process mandated by section 6(b), but also in
pre-enforcement judicial review under section 6(f).”
32. 917 F.2d 944, 951–52 (6th Cir. 1990).
33. Id. See supra note 30.
34. 583 F.2d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 1978).
35. Advance Bronze, 917 F.2d at 952.
36. 529 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1976).
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during the enforcement stage is intended,” citing the Senate report.37 The
court also stated that “such review is consistent with the rule that judicial
review is to be presumed.”38
In National Industrial Constructors, Inc. v. OSHRC, however, the
Eighth Circuit retreated from the broad language in Arkansas-Best.39 It
held that “a challenge to the validity of an OSHA regulation, based solely
upon [OSHA’s] failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the
APA, OSHA, or any other applicable statute, may only be raised in a preenforcement proceeding instituted pursuant to” OSH Act section 6(f).40
“Such attacks may not be raised in an enforcement proceeding.”41 It held
that substantive challenges, however, may always be mounted.42
6. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit held that it would not “foreclose a challenge to the
procedural validity of an OSHA regulation in the absence of express
authorization from Congress,” and that the Senate report’s “language . . .
is clear.”43
7. D.C. Circuit
In Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Secretary of Labor, the D.C. Circuit
noted the circuit split but stated:
We have considered the evidence of congressional intent put forward in
these cases, and we agree with the majority view that Congress intended
review of the validity of [OSHA] standards to be available in
enforcement proceedings before the Commission, and that Congress
drew no distinction between procedural and substantive challenges in
this regard.44

The opinion added, “[W]e are doing no more than interpreting
congressional intent as to the preclusive effects of OSHA’s provision for

37. Id. at 653 (citing S. Rep. No. 91–1282).
38. Id.
39. 583 F.2d at 1052–53 (8th Cir. 1978).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (2018); id. at 1052.
41. Nat’l Indus. Constructors, Inc., 583 F.2d at 1053.
42. Id. at 1052.
43. Marshall v. Union Oil Co., 616 F.2d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Noblecraft
Indus., Inc. v. Sec’y of Lab., 614 F.2d 199, 201–02 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[V]alidity of the standard can be
challenged in this review of the enforcement order.”).
44. 766 F.2d 575, 582 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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pre-enforcement review.”45 In General Carbon Co. v. OSHRC, the court
characterized Simplex as “clearly” holding that validity challenges during
enforcement are permitted.46
While this article was in preparation, events occurred in the D.C.
Circuit that shed light on the article’s thesis. In Kiewit Power Construction
Co. v. Secretary of Labor, an employer challenged the validity of a 1971
amendment, without notice-and-comment rulemaking or statutorily
required findings, of an OSHA standard adopted under OSH Act
section 6(a).47 That provision permitted OSHA, for the two-year period
between 1971 and 1973 and without regard to the APA and the OSH Act’s
regular rulemaking provision (OSH Act section 6(b)), to adopt certain
workplace safety standards.48 The court requested supplemental briefs on
whether JEM Broadcasting had, despite Simplex, foreclosed the
challenge.49
In response, the employer argued that JEM Broadcasting had no such
effect, citing unusually detailed evidence in the OSH Act’s legislative
history that Congress specifically intended non-exclusivity.50 The
employer also argued that APA section 703 “directly addresses this issue”
and that, unlike the JEM Broadcasting line of cases, the mere adequacy of
a pre-enforcement challenge provision “cannot alone prove that it is
‘exclusive’ [under APA section 703]—or ‘exclusive’ would . . . be
effectively read out of the statute.”51 The employer acknowledged that its
argument “treads a different path than the doctrine developed” in circuit
precedents but observed that they had “not indicate[d] . . . that this Court
[had] examined this matter in light of APA section 703.”52 The employer
stated that “[w]hile re-examination in light of § 703 would ordinarily be
appropriate” (citing two Supreme Court cases discarding judge-made law
in favor of APA provisions (discussed infra in Parts III A and B)), the
clarity of the legislative history made re-examination unnecessary.53

45. Id.
46. 860 F.2d 479, 483–84 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 665(a) (2018); 959 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2020). This writer was counsel for the
employer there.
48. See supra note 30.
49. Kiewit Power, 959 F.3d at 391.
50. Supplemental Brief of Kiewit Power, 2019 WL 5677848 at *5–10 (No. 11-2395) in Kiewit
Power.
51. Id. at *10–11.
52. Id. at *12.
53. Id.
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The court’s decision did not mention APA section 703, even though it
had been prominently briefed; the court stated that it “d[id] not reach” the
employer’s other arguments.54 Instead, based on the OSH Act’s legislative
history, the court reaffirmed Simplex’s holding that the OSH Act “allows
for a procedural challenge in an enforcement proceeding, at least for
section 6(a) standards.”55 That last phrase could, however, be read to imply
that exclusivity might apply to procedural challenges to standards adopted
under the OSH Act’s regular rulemaking provision, section 6(b).56 If so,
the phrase is inconsistent with the OSH Act’s legislative history (on which
the court purported to rely) and with APA section 703 (which it purported
not to reach), neither of which draws or suggests that distinction. The
phrase is also inconsistent with D.C. Circuit precedent, for in General
Carbon the court had permitted a challenge to a standard adopted under
OSH Act section 6(b).57
B. The Judge-Made Law is Inconsistent with APA § 703
The problem with the judge-made law exemplified by JEM
Broadcasting is that it is inconsistent with APA section 703’s third
sentence.
First, APA section 703 states a general rule permitting all validity
challenges during enforcement proceedings. It states that “agency action
is subject to judicial review in civil . . . proceedings for judicial
enforcement.”58 By contrast, the general rule of JEM Broadcasting and its
progeny is that “procedural attacks on a rule’s adoption are barred.”59
Second, APA section 703’s text provides only a narrow exception to
its general rule: the prior opportunity for judicial review must be
“adequate” and “exclusive.” The exception treats adequacy and
exclusiveness as separate elements that must both be independently
54. Kiewit Power, 959 F.3d at 392.
55. Id.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (2018); id. at 391. The Kiewit Power court stated: “[T]hat generalized
principles of finality may bar untimely procedural attacks under other statutes says nothing about the
viability of such a challenge under the OSH Act. . . . Indicia of congressional intent can vary from one
statute to another and we must take care to conduct an individualized inquiry. . . . We see no reason to
disregard Simplex’s determination that the OSH Act allows for a procedural challenge in an
enforcement proceeding, at least for section 6(a) standards.”
57. Gen. Carbon Co. v. OSHRC, 860 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1988). General Carbon concerned
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200, adopted in 1983 under OSH Act § 6(b). 48 Fed. Reg. 53280, 53320 (1983)
(stating authority for standard).
58. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2018) (emphasis added).
59. Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 195 F.3d 28 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (summarizing JEM Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 22 F.3d at 325).
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proved. By contrast, JEM Broadcasting infers exclusiveness from
adequacy alone.60
Third, the use of the word “[e]xcept” by APA section 703 means that
the burden of proving exclusivity should fall on the agency asserting it,
not the private party resisting it. 61 By contrast, JEM Broadcasting placed
the burden of establishing non-exclusivity on the private party.62
Fourth, APA section 703 draws no distinction between procedural and
substantive challenges, or between regulations adopted under one
provision but not another. By contrast, JEM Broadcasting distinguishes
between procedural and substantive challenges, and the D.C. Circuit in
Kiewit suggested a possible distinction between standards adopted under
OSH Act sections 6(a) and 6(b).63
Putting these differences together, APA section 703 creates a regime
strikingly inconsistent with that created by the JEM Broadcasting line of
cases.
What evidence would suffice to show exclusivity within the meaning
of section 703? It should presumably suffice for exclusivity to be stated
expressly, to be clearly implied by other language of the statute, or perhaps
to be clearly stated in its legislative history. For example, a provision of
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act states that a post-promulgation
petition is “the exclusive means of challenging the validity of” mine safety
standards.64
What cannot logically suffice, however, is silence, the existence of a
merely adequate pre-enforcement provision, or a judge’s idea of good
policy. The exception in APA section 703 is so worded that a court must
affirmatively conclude that a pre-enforcement challenge provision is
exclusive. It is difficult to see how such a conclusion could be drawn if the
pre-enforcement provision and its legislative history are both silent on the
point. And inasmuch as APA section 703 expressly requires courts to find
both adequacy and exclusivity, inferring exclusivity from mere adequacy

60. JEM Broad., 22 F.3d at 326 (looking to adequacy alone); see infra quotation at note 62.
61. Action on Smoking & Health v. CAB, 713 F.2d 795, 801 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“exception”).
62. JEM Broad., 22 F.3d at 326 (“[U]nder our established law, the result might differ if it
could be shown that no party ever had adequate opportunity to challenge a particular agency action.”
(emphasis added)). The court emphasized that non-exclusivity, rather than exclusivity, would be an
“exception.” Id. (“Thus, we have recognized exceptions to the limitations period when agency action
fails to put aggrieved parties on reasonable notice of the rule’s content, or when such action remains
unripe for judicial review throughout the statutory review period.”).
63. See supra the court’s statement quoted at note 56.
64. 30 U.S.C. § 811(d) (2018).
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(as JEM Broadcasting does) would fail to give independent meaning to
the key word “exclusive” and would effectively read it out of the statute.
As to a judge’s idea of good policy, “[j]udicial action must be
governed by standard, by rule, and [it] must be principled, rational, and
based upon reasoned distinctions found in the . . . laws.”65 A finding of
exclusivity not drawn from tangible evidence of congressional intent
would violate that principle.
The above approach to APA section 703’s exception was evident in
the recent separate opinion by Justice Kavanaugh, speaking for himself
and three other justices in PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris
Chiropractic.66 The statute there was the Hobbs Act, the pre-enforcement
provision of which is silent on whether it is exclusive.67 Justice Kavanaugh
reasoned that “elementary principles of administrative law establish that
the proper default rule is to allow review” of the agency’s position unless
exclusivity is stated “expressly” and hence that the “silence” of the Hobbs
Act on exclusivity was insufficient.68
Justice Kavanaugh’s view was soon endorsed by Judges Newsom and
Branch of the Eleventh Circuit in their concurring opinion in Gorss
Motels, Inc. v. Safemark Systems, LP.69 Quoting Justice Kavanaugh, they
wrote that “‘elementary principles of administrative law establish that the
proper default rule is to allow [judicial] review’ unless Congress says
otherwise,” and that judicial review during enforcement must be
“expressly preclude[d].”70

III. An Unfortunate Pattern of Ignoring the APA
Section 703’s third sentence is not the only APA provision that courts
have ignored. Some examples follow.

65. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019).
66. 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2057 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (2018).
68. PDR Network, 139 S. Ct. at 2058–62.
69. 931 F.3d 1094, 1105–12 (11th Cir. 2019).
70. Id. at 1109. They also wrote: “At least in the ordinary case, our precedents task all persons
with both the foreknowledge—some would say the clairvoyance—to identify any agency orders that
might concern them in future litigation and the resources to bring an immediate challenge against each
of those orders. ‘Requiring all those potentially affected parties to bring a facial, pre-enforcement
challenge within 60 days or otherwise forfeit their right to challenge an agency’s interpretation of a
statute borders on the absurd.’” Id. at 1110 (quoting PDR Network, 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2062 (2019)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment)). Judges Newsom and Branch also quoted with approval
Justice Powell’s concurrence in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 290 (1978). See
quotation supra note 11.
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A. Exhaustion of Administrative Appeals

Before 1993, several federal appellate courts followed a judicially
created doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.71 In Darby v.
Cisneros, however, the Supreme Court held that in many cases APA
section 704 “plainly” does not require exhaustion when the judge-made
doctrine would have required it.72 The Court noted, with an air of
exasperation, that Professor Kenneth Culp Davis had stated in his 1958
treatise73 that this provision “had been almost completely ignored in
judicial opinions,” and that Professor Davis had “reiterated that
observation 25 years later” in his treatise’s later edition.74 In putting aside
the judge-made rule, the Court stated: “Courts are not free to impose an
exhaustion requirement as a rule of judicial administration where the
agency action has already become ‘final’ under” the APA.75
B. Non-APA Scope of Review of Agency Factual Findings
For many years, the Federal Circuit reviewed findings of fact by the
Patent and Trademark Office under a judge-made “clear error” standard
rather than the “substantial evidence” standard in APA section 706(2)(E).
In Dickinson v. Zurko, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit was
required to apply the APA test.76 It emphasized that “[t]he APA was meant
to bring uniformity to a field full of variation and diversity.”77
C. Non-APA Ripeness Doctrine to Limit Judicial Review
APA sections 702 and 704 together state that one “suffering legal
wrong” or “adversely affected or aggrieved by” “final agency action for
71. Darby v. Kemp, 957 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1992), rev’d sub nom. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S.
137 (1993); Missouri v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1987); Montgomery v. Rumsfeld, 572 F.2d
250, 253–54 (9th Cir. 1978). But see Gulf Oil Corp. v. DOE, 663 F.2d 296, 308 & n.73 (D.C. Cir.
1981); New Eng. Coal. on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87, 99 (1st Cir. 1978); United States
v. Consol. Mines & Smelting Co., 455 F.2d 432, 439–40 (9th Cir. 1971).
72. 509 U.S. 137 (1993). APA § 704 states: “Except as otherwise expressly required by
statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has
been presented or determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration,
or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative,
for an appeal to superior agency authority.” 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018).
73. KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 101 (1st ed. 1958).
74. Darby, 509 U.S. at 145; KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 468–69
(2d ed. 1983) (“The provision is relevant in hundreds of cases and is customarily overlooked.”).
75. Darby, 509 U.S. at 143.
76. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
77. Id. at 155.
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which there is no adequate remedy in a court” is entitled to judicial
review.78 Despite this, the Supreme Court has interposed the doctrine of
“prudential ripeness” to balance “the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.”79 As Professor John Duffy has demonstrated, however,
“ripeness doctrine has no place in the APA” because it “does not authorize
balancing.”80
D. Judicial Deference to Federal Agency Interpretations
The most spectacular examples of judges ignoring the APA are
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.81 and
Auer v. Robbins.82 They respectively held, in effect, that federal courts
must uphold federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous
statutes and regulations. Neither case considered the APA’s provisions on
judicial review, even though the APA’s language and legislative history at
least suggest (if not outright prove) that Congress intended that judicial
interpretation be de novo.83
In the recent Kisor v. Wilkie, the Court attempted to reconcile Auer
with the APA.84 The attempt fell short, however, for the Court failed to
discuss what Professor Kenneth Culp Davis (a drafter of the APA 85) had,
78. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018) (“A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018) (“Agency action made
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court
are subject to judicial review.”).
79. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
80. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 162,
177 (1998).
81. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
82. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
83. Principal APA drafter and House report author Rep. Francis Walter stated that section 706
“requires courts to determine independently all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation
of constitutional or statutory provisions.” STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG.,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT—LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1944-46, S. Doc. No. 248, at 370 (1946)
(“APA-Leg.Hist.”) (emphasis added). Both H.R. Rep. 79-1980, at 278 (1946), APA-Leg.Hist. 278,
and S. Rep. 79-752, at 214 (1945), APA-Leg.Hist. 214, stated that “questions of law are for the courts
rather than agencies to decide in the last analysis . . . .” For academic comment, see, e.g., Duffy,
Administrative Common Law, supra note 80, 77 TEX. L. REV. at 194 (§ 706’s “plain language alone
suggests de novo review.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE
L.J. 969, 995 (1992) (“[A]ll” in § 706 “suggests that Congress contemplated courts would always
apply independent judgment on questions of law.”).
84. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
85. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Approaches to Regulatory Reform in the United States: A Response to
the Remarks of Professors Levin and Freeman, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1893, 1893 (2005) (“[Kenneth Culp
Davis] helped draft [the] APA.”); Paul Verkuil, Present at the Creation: Regulatory Reform Before
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soon after Chevron’s issuance, identified as the most pertinent part of the
APA on the deference issue—the word “all” in APA section 706.86 That
provision, entitled “Scope of review,” states: “To the extent necessary to
decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law . . . .”87 Professor Davis argued that Chevron is contrary
to “all” in section 706 and is “the opposite of what Congress had
legislated.”88 The word “all” never appeared in Kisor.
The Court’s failure to come to grips with the issue is unfortunate, for
a moment’s reflection would have revealed the inconsistency of deference
with section 706. Under Chevron and Auer, courts decide two questions—
whether the statute or regulation is ambiguous; and, if so, whether the
agency’s interpretation is reasonable. The court does not decide the key
question—how the ambiguous statute or regulation is to be construed.
Instead, the agency decides it.89 And that omission is contrary to the word
“all,” which the Court failed to apply. For this reason, Kisor will not be
the last word on the consistency of deference with the APA.

IV. How Did We Get Here?
A. Counsel and Courts
Nearly all the blame for courts overlooking the APA lies with counsel,
who frequently fail to cite APA provisions. But much blame must also be
shouldered by the courts, who often fail to consult the APA for a rule of
decision on administrative law questions. Judges raised in the common
law tradition naturally gravitate to judge-made law. Judge-made law is
also apt to be more finely grained, more attuned to the equities in a
1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 509, 509–511 (1986).
86. KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EIGHTIES § 29:16-1, p. 509, § 29:162, p. 510 (1989).
87. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (emphasis added).
88. E.g., DAVIS, supra note 86, at 509–510 (“[T]he Court . . . ignored and violated the entirely
clear provision of . . . [APA] § 706 . . . that ‘the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law.’ The contrast between the statutory words and the Court’s words could hardly be stronger . . . .
The Court directly violated the clear statute.”).
89. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assn. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)
(“If a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, Chevron
requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading
differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.”); id. at 983 (“Chevron teaches
that a court’s opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous statute an agency is charged with
administering is not authoritative . . . the agency remains the authoritative interpreter (within the limits
of reason) of such statutes.”) (alteration to the original); see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 528
(2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is to agency officials, not to the Members of this Court, that
Congress has given discretion to choose among permissible interpretations of the statute.”).
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particular case, and more likely to reflect a judge’s nuanced knowledge of
legal administration. But in a democracy, none of these reasons can
suffice. Unlike judge-made law, the APA is the consensus of the people’s
representatives and must be applied even if not cited.
Aside from political illegitimacy, the judge-made law of exclusivity
can be criticized for other reasons. As the case law under the OSH Act
illustrates, the courts’ exclusivity holdings have been complex,
inconsistent, and unstable. Distinctions have been drawn between
substantive and procedural challenges. One court has distinguished
between employers who previously participated in rulemaking and preenforcement challenge proceedings, and those who did not.90 Another
court has hinted at a distinction between challenges to standards adopted
under one rulemaking provision and another.91 None of these distinctions,
however, rest on anything in the OSH Act’s language or legislative history.
On the contrary, the OSH Act’s legislative history states with unusual
clarity and without qualification that employers may challenge standards
during enforcement.92 Worse, these distinctions have been drawn or
suggested even when the court had been made aware of the OSH Act’s
unqualified legislative history, and in one case even when APA
section 703 was cited to the court.93 Not only do the distinctions rest solely
on the judges’ ideas of good policy, but they also suffer from the lack of
clarity typical of distinctions being hammered out in case law. For
example, is an agency’s failure to make a statutorily required rulemaking
finding that a regulation is “feasible” a procedural or a substantive defect?
Worse, opinions have been internally inconsistent, and opinions within the
same circuit have vacillated, sometimes with a panel appearing to be
unaware of its own precedent.
By contrast, the third sentence of APA section 703 is simple, clear,
and provides an easily administered rule—one that draws none of the
above distinctions. The situation brings to mind an observation by
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis: “Altogether, the law made by judges seems

90. RSR Corp. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 1984); see quotation in the text
accompanying supra note 31.
91. Kiewit Pwr. Constr. Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 959 F.3d 381, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see supra
text accompanying notes 55–57.
92. See quotation from the legislative history in the text accompanying supra note 29.
93. See citations supra notes 50–53 to the employer’s supplemental brief in Kiewit Power,
959 F.3d at 392, which specifically cited APA § 703 to the court. Despite this, the court did not cite
the statute.

16

1]

The Little Statute that Gets No Respect

to me clearly inferior to statutes and administrative rules in clarity,
reliability, and freedom from conflict.”94
B. Academia
Part of the problem may also be that academic scholarship on
exclusivity has ignored the third sentence of APA section 703.
In 1982, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
received a report on the exclusivity of pre-enforcement challenges by Paul
Verkuil, a professor of administrative law at Tulane Law School.95 ACUS
soon adopted a recommendation to Congress on the subject.96 The ACUS
recommendation did not mention APA section 703’s third sentence.
Professor Verkuil’s study mentioned APA section 703’s third
sentence briefly but inaccurately. It stated that APA section 703
“specifically recognizes . . . that enforcement review can be deemed
precluded if an adequate opportunity for preenforcement review is
presented.”97 The statement is inaccurate because it ignores section 703’s
other key criterion—exclusivity.
In 2011, Professor Verkuil’s study was celebrated in a festschrift by
Ronald Levin, professor of administrative law at Washington University
in St. Louis.98 Professor Levin’s paper is in much the same vein as
Professor Verkuil’s. It too emphasized the word “adequate” but ignored
section 703’s use of “exclusive.”99
One might speculate that both scholars did not mention the word
“exclusive” (or treated it as meaningless) because the judge-made doctrine
followed by the courts had often implied exclusivity from adequacy alone.
But the judge-made doctrine had been built without consideration of APA
section 703. Professors Verkuil and Levin also failed to consider that to
imply exclusivity from adequacy alone would not give exclusivity the
independent status that its parallel use in section 703 signifies.
94. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed
Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1986).
95. Paul R. Verkuil, Congressional Limitations on Judicial Review of Rules, 57 TUL. L. REV.
733 (1983).
96. Conference Recommendation 82-7, 47 Fed. Reg. 58,208 (Dec. 30, 1982) (formerly
codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-7 (1993)) (now available at www.acus.gov/recommendation/judicialreview-rules-enforcement-proceedings (last visited Sept. 21, 2020)).
97. Verkuil, supra note 95, at 760 (emphasis added). Nearly the same statement occurs at 754
n.82 (Section 703 “contemplates that Yakus-type enforcement limitations might exist where adequate
opportunities for pre-enforcement review are present.”).
98. Ronald M. Levin, Statutory Time Limits on Judicial Review of Rules: Verkuil Revisited,
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2203, 2217 (2011).
99. See id. at 2208.
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The Verkuil paper illustrates another way in which scholarship has
fallen short on this subject. An early Supreme Court case often mentioned
is Yakus v. United States.100 There, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of section 204(d) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, which had
expressly made a short pre-enforcement challenge period exclusive.101 The
Court held that the provision was constitutional because it provided an
“adequate” opportunity for pre-enforcement review. Professor Verkuil
characterized APA section 703 as having been passed to “incorporate[] the
‘adequacy’ standard of Yakus.”102 That may be so, but it again ignores that
section 703 also expressly incorporated the statutory exclusivity criterion
featured by the statute in Yakus.103

V. Recommendations: What the Courts Need to Do
First, the Supreme Court should state plainly that, on administrative
law questions, it is the duty of federal judges to consult the APA to
determine whether it supplies a rule of decision and, if it does, to follow
it, regardless of any previous judge-made law and regardless of any failure
by the parties to have cited it. If needed to ensure fairness, courts should
invite supplemental briefs.
Although federal judges cannot be reasonably expected to know every
corner of every statutory scheme, they can be reasonably expected to
recognize when the APA applies to a question, just as they can be
reasonably expected to know and apply the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. This is especially true of the D.C. Circuit, which has been
assigned a heavy load of administrative agency appeals.
Second, courts must resist old habits and give primacy to statutes, not
judge-made law. They should not try to shoe-horn APA provisions into
judge-made law. Failing to treat the APA as the fount from which case law
should freely develop on its own terms would be nearly as undemocratic
100. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
101. Id.; Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, § 204(d), 56 Stat. 23, 33
(“Except as provided in this section, no court, Federal, State, or Territorial, shall have jurisdiction or
power to consider the validity of any such regulation, order, or price schedule.”).
102. Verkuil, supra note 95, at 741 n.34 (“The legislative history of the APA leaves little doubt
that this sentence, which incorporates the ‘adequacy’ standard of Yakus, was added to account for the
possible reappearance of the EPCA judicial review solution in other statutes.”).
103. A student paper posted on the internet in draft form and apparently slated for publication
by the George Washington Law Review, John Hindley, “Timing is Not the Enemy,”
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3504338 (last visited Oct. 14, 2020), is also in
the same vein as the articles by Professors Verkuil and Levin. The thirty-eight-page-long typescript
does not discuss APA section 703 until page 34, nearly entirely ignores the statute’s use of the word
“exclusive,” and focuses on case law nearly to the exclusion of the statute.
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and faithless to the constitutional roles of Congress and courts as outright
ignoring the APA. Statutes should not be warped by case law that did not
consider the congressional intent behind them.
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